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1. Introduction 
 
Elections are a core element of representative political systems. Participation in elections is 
seen as an important indicator to measure the democratic degree of political systems. Franklin 
(2002: 148) correctly states: “the health of democracy is often seen in terms of its level of 
turnout.” When turnout figures tend to decline, which appears to be the case the last few 
decades in most Western countries, this causes worries on the side of the political system. 
Similarly, scholarly attention for this topic, which is one of the classic ones in political 
science, has intensified. 
Most of the research on electoral participation focuses on the importance of individual (social 
demographic and social-psychological) variables and political attitudes  to explain turnout  
(e.g. Lijphart, 1997; Hooghe & Pelleriaux, 1998; De Winter & Ackaert, 1998). Less attention 
is paid to the influence of the broader social, cultural, institutional and political context 
variables on turnout. Even when this approach is followed, attention has almost exclusively 
gone to cross-national variations (e.g. Jackman & Miller, 1995 ; Blais & Dobrzynska, 1998) 
instead of to variations within one country. Yet, local elections allow researchers to analyse 
electoral participation taking particular local political, social, cultural and institutional factors 
into account. By consequence, we use for this paper the municipalities as unit of analysis. At 
this level, it is possible to measure the impact of political as well socio-demographic 
contextual characteristics on turnout and blanc/ invalid voting. This is not possible for 
aggregated analyses at the level of constituencies for general elections or even higher levels. 
 
We take municipalities in Flanders, a region of Belgium, as units of analysis. Belgium is an 
interesting case to analyse. Compulsory voting constitutes one of the main characteristics of 
the Belgian electoral system. The system of compulsory voting adds a particular element to 
the phenomenon of abstentionism, which remains possible despite the regulations concerning 
compulsory voting. Two sorts of abstentionism do occur: visible and hidden abstentionism. 
Visible abstentionism refers to voters that are not turning up at the polling station to cast their 
vote.  Given that turning up is in principle compulsory (but hardly sanctioned), not appearing 
in the polling station has (at least morally) a negative connotation among the broad public. 
Hidden abstentionism refers to voters that visit the polling booth, but cast a blanc or invalid 
vote. Except for those cases where voters accidentally released an invalid ballot, only the 
voter himself knows this, which renders this form of absentionism less visible for the external 
environment. Given these differences in visibility, we expect to find different underlying 
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mechanisms for these two sorts of abstentionism. The last general election results pointed out 
that nearly 11 pct. of the registered voters did not show up at the ballot station and that nearly 
6 pct. of the voters casted a blanc or invalid vote. 
 
We limit our analysis to the Flemish municipalities. As a result of successive state reforms in 
Belgium, it is nearly impossible to find data of contextual variables that are comparable for 
the three regions. Yet, this paper starts with a description of the evolution of electoral 
absenteeism and blanc/invalid votes in Belgium. 
 
1. Electoral abstentionism in Belgium 
 
a. Visible abstentionism: absenteeism 
 
Table I presents the evolution of electoral absenteeism for general elections, local elections 
and elections for the European Parliament during the period 1976 - 20100.  
  
 Table I: Evolution of electoral absenteeism  for general elections,  EP elections and  
 local elections  
 
General elections  EP-Elections  Local Elections  
Year Pct. Year Pct. Year Pct. 
          
1977 5,1 1979 8,6 1976 5,3 
1978 6,0 1984 7,9 1982 5,8 
1981 5,5 1989 9,3 1988 6,5 
1985 6,4 1994 9,8 1994 7,7 
1987 6,6 1999 9,4 2000 8,4 
1991 7,3 2004 9,1 2006 7,0 
1995 8,9 2009 9,6    
1999 9,4        
2003 8,4        
2007 9,1        
2010 10,3         
 
This table indicates first of all that during the whole period under consideration, the rate of 
absenteeism is the highest at elections for the European Parliament, followed by general 
elections and finally local elections. Absenteeism has been increasing till the end of the 
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previous century. The figures for the beginning of this century suggest a decline. However, 
this decrease seemed – at least for EP and general elections - to have been an accidental event. 
 
Hence, two phenomena have to be explained: a) the differences between elections according 
to the elected body; b) the evolution of absenteeism over time (increase till the end of the 
previous century and decrease at the last few elections). 
 
The first phenomenon can be explained in several ways. First of all, the variable "tourist 
behavior" during periods in which elections take place seems to have a strong impact, 
especially with regard to Europeans elections. According to tourist behavior data, over two 
hundred thousand Belgians are abroad on weekends in June. This number corresponds more 
or less to the difference between the number of absenteeists at European elections and at 
general elections 1. Yet, on should deduce from this figure the number of children. In addition, 
over a hundred of thousand persons are abroad during a weekend of December, month in 
which several general elections have taken place. Therefore, the difference between the rate of 
absenteeism at European and general elections is only partially explicable by the variable 
"tourist behavior". Thus it is necessary to call upon others interpretations to explain in a more 
exhaustive manner differences between types of elections.  
 
First, voters' perceptions of the political importance of the elected body is important. Belgian 
citizens consider the federal parliament as more important than local councils.  The European 
Parliament is considered least important (Swyngedouw, De Winter & Schulpen, 1990) and 
European elections are in general considered as second-order elections (Schmitt 2005).  This 
varying perception can suffice as explanation for the difference of absenteeism level between 
general elections and EP-elections. Yet, although the voter attaches apparently less 
importance to local elections than to general elections, absenteeism at local elections is 
surprisingly not higher than at general elections. Moreover, the seat distribution technology 
used for local election tends less toward proportional representation voting (PRV) than is the 
case for general elections (Ackaert: 1994). Normally, according to empirical findings on the 
relation between the existence of PRV and turnout, absenteeism should increase when the 
electoral system is less proportional (Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 1993; Karp & Banducci,  1999; 
                                                 
1June is always the month for the EP-elections. The information on tourist behavior is drawn 
from a survey by a regional economical office (West-Vlaams Studiebureau of the 
Gewestelijke Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij of the West-Flanders province). 
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Milner, 2004; Brockington, 2004; Selb, 2009).  Probably this is due to the fact that the direct 
stakes of local elections are larger. Stakes affect turnout (Franklin, 1999; Siaroff & Merer, 
2002; Dalton, 2008). Citizens have a more direct impact on the designation of the executive at 
the local level than at the federal level. For instance, at local elections of 8 October 2006, in 
nearly 52% of the municipalities, voters have, directly appointed the (single party) political 
majority (Ackaert e.a., 2007). At the federal level, since 1954 all governments have been 
coalition governments.  
 
Also the proximity and the knowledge of elected bodies is higher for municipal councils than 
for the other (higher level) elected bodies. Although the formal powers of the local level in 
Flanders are rather limited, this policy level is important since its competences are highly 
relevant and visible for citizens (Deschouwer, 2009). This also can boost political 
participation.   
 
Belgian trust indicators also show that institutions at the local level always score higher than 
institutions at a higher (regional, national, European) level (Kampen & Van de Walle, 2003). 
It can reasonably be expected that political institutions that are trusted by the people tend to 
attract more voters willing to cast a vote, and hence a higher voter turnout (Hooghe et al, 
2011) 
  
Finally, the social distance between the voter and the elected representatives is smaller for the 
municipal councils, followed by the federal Parliament and the European Parliament. This is 
for instance reflected in the much higher number of preferential votes cast for candidates at 
local elections than at general elections 2. 
 
Now, we turn to explanations for the evolution over time. 
The overall increase of absenteeism in the period 1977-1999 can be explained by purely 
demographic factors.  There are good reasons to believe that there is a relationship between 
the growth of the absenteeism since 1977 and the demographic evolution of the population 
entitled to vote. Like many other post- industrial societies, Belgium is confronted with an 
                                                 
  2At the general elections, nearly 50% of the electorate uses the preferential vote (instead of 
a list vote). Although complete figures are not available, the proportion of preferential votes 
at local elections is estimated around 80% (Ackaert, 1994; Wauters,2000; Wauters, Verlet 
& Ackaert, 2011 – forthcoming). 
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aging of the population. This phenomenon can be expressed by an "aging index", i.e. the ratio 
persons over 60 years and children between 0 and 14 years, multiplied by hundred.   In 1970, 
this indication was at 81.  By 1990, it had grown to 115 (Alen & Billiet, 1990). As the social 
integration of the elderly becomes less intense, also their political integration weakens. In 
addition, the elderly often have health problems that prevent them to go out and vote. 
 
The 1981 general elections constitute a temporary break in the regular increase of 
absenteeism. Also this can be explained by demographic factors. In 1981, the voting age was 
lowered from 21 to 18 years. Compared with the year 1978, the electorate of 1981 increased 
by more than 500.000 units (Fraeys, 1982). Many researchers have indicated that absenteeism 
is higher than average among youths (a.o. due to unfinished political socialization). So given 
this arrival of numerous young adults on the electoral market in 1981, absenteeism should 
have increased. It did not, on the contrary. This opposite effect can be explained by the 
specifications made by Lancelot (1968), who found that young citizens seem to refrain from 
voting only after their first electoral experience. This specification allows us to explain the 
decline of the absenteeism in 1981 by demographic factors, as well as its considerable increa-
se at the next general elections of 1985. 
 
The first elections during this century suggested, as mentioned above, a slight decrease of 
absenteeism. This was the case for all types of elections. We can only offer some partial 
explanations for this trend. Although nothing changed in the nature of the described 
demographic process, it is likely that the social structure of the ‘new’ aged categories differs 
from the previous generations. However, more research is needed to make this clear and to 
identify the impact of scolarisation, better health conditions, participation in welfare on the 
degree of political participation of the older age categories. Secondly, we may not forget that 
‘states with the least facilitative legal systems have the lowest turnout’ (Milbrath & Goel, 
1977). Particularly for the local elections, rules became more facilitative in Belgium. This was 
mostly the case in the Flemish region3. Yet, the evolution in variation of absenteeism do not 
reflect this instituitional changes perfectly. In the Flemish region (were the most flexible rules 
were introduced), absenteeism decreased from 6,9 to 5,6 percent, in the Walloons from 9,1 to 
8,1 pct. and in the Brussels region from 17,1 to 13,0 percent (Ackaert a.o., 2007). Moreover, 
this decline seemed, at least for EP and local elections, to have been a single event. 
                                                 
3 Ballot stations prolonged in the Flemish region their opening hours and rules concerning voting by proxy 
became more pliable.  
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b. Hidden abstentionism: blanc and invalid voting 
 
Table II gives an overview of the evolution of the blank or invalid votes at general, provincial 
and local elections and elections for the European Parliament between 1976 and 2010.  
Concerning general elections, a distinction is made between the House of Representatives and 
the Senate4. 
 
 Table II: Evolution of blank or invalid votes for general elections – provincial elections -  
 EP elections and local elections.  
 
 House Senate Province E.P.-elections Local elections 
Year Pct. Pct. Year Pct. Year Pct. Year Pct. 
         
1977 7,2 8,1 1977 7,5 1979 12,4 1976 3,6 
1978 8,4 9,3 1978 8,8 1984 10,9 1982 4,8 
1981 7,3 8,2 1981 7,6 1989 8,4 1988 4,7 
1985 7,4 8,5 1985 7,8 1994 8,9 1994 5,0 
1987 6,6 7,4 1987 7,0 1999 7,0 2000 5,1 
1991 7,0 7,6 1991 7,5 2004 5,4 2006 4,7 
1995 7,5 8,7 1994 7,5 2009 6,3   
1999 6,0 6,2 2000 6,9     
2003 5,3 5,6 2006 6,7     
2007 5,1 5,7       
2010 5,8 6,6       
 
This table shows that, till the end of the previous decade, blank or invalid voting is highest at 
elections for the European Parliament, followed by elections for the Senate, the provincial 
council and the House. Blank or invalid voting is lowest for local elections. The last series of 
elections suggest shifts in the ranking order. 
Curiously, there is a difference in blank or invalid voting rates of around one percent between 
the House and the Senate till 1995. That difference reduced after 1995 but increased again 
later on. The blank or invalid vote at the elections for the provincial councils was, in the 
period that general and provincial elections coincided,  situa ted between the House and Senate 
rates. The differences in blank or invalid voting rates differ between types of elections and 
can again be explained by the political importance the voters confer to the elected bodies. 
                                                 
 4 Before the 1994, elections for the provincial councils  coincided with general elections. Due to the constitutional 
reforms of 1993, in 1994 provincial elections coincided for the first time with the local elections. 
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This variable does not fully explain these differences. Although local councils are considered 
to be less political important that the federal Parliament, the number of blank or invalid votes 
is considerably lower at local elections. The limited political importance of local councils can 
– as explained with regard to absenteeism - again be compensated by the more direct electoral 
stakes, the larger proximity of the citizen to this elected body and the smaller distances 
between the citizen and political representatives at this level.  
These types of explanations can equally serve for interpreting differences between the House, 
the provinces and the Senate. The political importance and the proximity of the Senate used to 
be considered as lesser of those of the House. Also social distance between voters and 
representatives has an impact. This distance is larger for the Senate than for the House. Before 
1995, the boundaries for the House elections were smaller (‘arrondissements’) than for the 
Senate, electoral districts consisted of a merger of two or more House electoral districts. This 
differences were reflected in the number of votes of preference cast, which for the House is 
approximately 10% higher than for the Senate (Das, 1988). From 1995 onwards, Senate 
elections use the main regions as constituency, while for the House, the (lower) provincial 
boundaries form the electoral districts. Owing to the enlargement of the electoral districts, the 
Senate elections have attracted prominent party figures (party leaders, (deputy) prime 
ministers, etc.) as candidates. Therefore, the importance of the Senate elections has increased. 
This could be an explanation for the decline in the gap between House and Senate in terms of 
blanc/invalid votes, despite differences in district size that remain.  
 
As far as provincial council elections are concerned, the political importance of the province 
has long been considered as limited (Orianne, 1967). This can explain the fact that blank or 
invalid voting was at that administrative level traditionally higher than for the House. The fact 
that the use of the blank or invalid vote at elections for the provincial councils is however not 
higher that for the Senate probably had a double origin. In the first place, during the eighties, 
the political interest for the provincial institution has increased.  Little by little, provinces 
invested a lot in their  recognition as an important level in the administrative organization of 
the country (Maes & Delmartino, 1986; De Ceuninck & Steyvers, 2007). In the second place, 
many local representatives are candidate for the provincial council elections what reduces the 
 9 
social distance between voters and candidates5. The coincidence of provincial and local 
elections later on reinforced this trend. 
Concerning general elections, it is possible to discern a slight decrease of the proportion of 
blank or invalid votes between the beginning and the end of our period of observation. 
However, this trend is not constant.  In comparison with the year 1976, the blank or invalid 
vote proportion has increased at local elections but neither in a continuous way. Blank or 
invalid voting decreased clearly for the European elections. 
 
2. Research questions  
 
The main research question is the identification of the variables that affect electoral non-
participation at the local level. Electoral non-participation can be indicated by absenteeism as 
well by the use of blanco/invalid votes. It is common sense that both expressions of non 
participation are considered to be equal, although factual evidence is missing. As indicated in 
the introduction, we expect because of the differences in visibility that the underlying 
mechanisms will be different for these two forms of abstentionism. 
For this reason, we discern in our analysis absenteeism from blanc/invalid voting. By 
consequence the second research question deals with similarities (or the absence of it)  
between the factors influencing electoral absenteeism on the one hand and blanc/inva lid 
voting on the other hand. 
 
3. Assumptions  
 
We introduce four blocks of variables. The first is related with the social demographic 
structure of the municipalities. The second on indicates the volume of social capital. The third 
one is consisted out of political characteristics and the last one refers to voting technology.  
                                                 
 5We dispose only of information about the involvement of mayors in the provincial elections. 
About 18% of the Belgian mayors were candidate for a seat in the provincial council in 
1991(Ackaert, 1992). 
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a. Social demographic variables 
 
The first one includes social demographic variables (size, age-structure, SES-distribution, 
ethnic-cultural diversity) of municipalities. The size of the place of residence has often been 
described as an important independent variable for explaining political participation. Milbrath 
and Goel distinguish two trends in literature (Milbrath & Goel, 1977). One version expects a 
higher political involvement in urban areas because city inhabitants are perceived to be closer 
to the (political) centre than rural dwellers. Others state that due to impersonal, complicated 
and distant life in cities, electoral participation will be more intensive in rural areas. 
Nevertheless, Frandsen confirmed after exploring the relationship between size and turnout in 
five European countries since the 1970s the conclusions of Dahl and Tufte's 1973 classic 
study Size and Democracy, which claimed that citizens' motivation to participate is greater in 
small governmental units than in large ones (Frandsen, 2002). 
The relationship between gender and political participation is also a frequently recurring 
finding in the study of political participation. This relationship is partly due to traditional role 
perceptions (the political role in a family was assigned to the man) and the unequal position of 
women (compared with men) in various segments of society (education, employment, etc.). 
However, recent research reveals the existence of a variety of gender gaps across modes op 
participation rather than an overall gender gap in political behavior. With regard to electoral 
participation, different scholars notice that after controlling for attitudinal characteristics, 
women are more likely to vote than men (Coffe & Bolzendahl, 2011; Childs, 2004).  
Traditionally, the relationship between electoral absenteeism and age is explained by three 
mediating variables, the integration into the community, availability of time and the health of 
citizens. The integration into society grows gradually with the marriage (or cohabitation) and  
the professional involvment. Reaching a high(er) age increases the possibility of the 
confrontation with physical obstacles and a reduced social integration. Jennings & Markus 
argue that partipation in more demanding modes of political action does decline with the 
onset of old age. But, the age-related decrease of political activity can not be proven for less 
demanding forms of engagement  including voting (Jennings & Markus, 1988). Dalton (2008) 
makes a distinction between types of participation. In his view, older people tend to prefer 
more traditional modes of participation, such a casting a vote in elections. Younger people 
participate not less, but rather differently and they are using different participation 
instruments. They opt for more direct, temporary, issue-specific and elite-challenging 
activities such as setting up an electronic community to fight for a cause. Consequently, they 
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tend to participate less in classic participation procedures and it can be expected that turnout 
will be lower among young people.   
The impact of SES can be understood in the frame work of the resource theory. This theory 
states that participation depends upon the ‘resources’ one has (Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978). 
Resources include among others money, education, time, civic engagement and access to 
political information. Some citizens are better equipped than others to participate. From 
several studies, it appears that people from lower socio-economic classes often lack these vital 
resources and –as a consequence– participate less in political activities. We should note that 
the effect of these variables will be tested here on the macro level. It is not an analysis of 
resources on the individual level that we are undertaking here, but an analysis of the influence 
of the social structure of a municipality.  
Concerning the influence of ethnic-cultural diversity, the general assumption is that the level 
of diversity has no direct impact on political participation but an indirect one by the effect of 
diversity on social capital. Putnam registered that a wide array of measures of social capital 
and civic engagement are negatively correlated with ethnic diversity. In areas of greater 
diversity, confidence in local government, local leaders and local news media is lower, 
political efficacy decreases and the frequency of registering to vote is lower. Putnam explains 
it by: “people living in ethnically diverse settings appear to ‘hunker down’ – that is, to pull in 
like a turtle.” (Putnam, 2007). 
 
b. Social capital  
 
The end of the previous paragraph already introduced the importance of social capital for 
political participation. The attention for the relevance of social capital for political 
participation is growing. Social capital is not only reflected in interpersonal trust and 
commitment but also in the confidence that people put in (political) institutions what increases 
political participation. Two components of social capital can be distinguished: structural and 
cultural components (Putnam, 2000). One structural element of social capital that is relevant 
here is the associational life of a community. Voluntary organizations based on membership 
can be seen as ‘schools of democracy’ where social and civic skills are learnt. Moreover, 
voluntary organizations play an important role in the recruitment of candidates. We 
hypothesize that a flourishing associational life increases the chance that people are aware of 
the importance of a voting. The associational life of a community is measured by the number 
of voluntary associations at the local level as proxy. The choice for this indicator is not only  
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based on substantive reasons but also on practical opportunities. Recent data on the number of 
associations at the local level in Flanders are available (Lauwereysen & Colpaert, 2004). 
Moreover, this proxy serves as a particularly good indicator for social capital as the formal 
voluntary association is the most important form of horizontal interaction and reciprocity.  
 
c. Political variables 
 
Much attention has been paid in literature towards the impact of political variables on 
electoral participation. Milbrath and Goel discerned the influence of the party system and the 
importance of elections (Milbrath & Goel, 1977). Concerning the party system, they 
concluded that turnout was lowest in multi-party constituencies and highest in two-party 
constituencies. Milbrath and Goel explained further on that persons are more likely to turn out 
for elections they perceive to be important. By consequence, we can assume that in (local) 
political systems where the voter has a direct impact on the composition of the executive body 
(board of alderman and mayor) turnout will be larger than in municipalities where this organ 
is composed after a process of multiple party coalition building. In fact municipalities where 
citizens can confirm or reject the incumbent single party majority are characterized by party 
polarisation. Several scholars described party polarisation as an important factor in explaining 
electoral turnout   (Franklin, 1999; Siaroff & Merer, 2002; Dalton, 2008). 
Research at the level of the voter shows a relation between voting on anti-system parties and 
potential absenteeism in case compulsory voting would be abolished (Ackaert & De Winter, 
1993). The vote on a anti-system party can be considered as an alternative for electoral 
abstaining for citizens who reject the overall functioning of the political system (Hooghe et al, 
2011).  By consequence, it is worth to examine the impact of a anti-system party on turnout 
and blanc/invalid voting. We use here the presence of extreme right wing parties as 
independent variable. 
d. Voting technology 
We earlier proved that electronic voting stimulates voters to cast a preferential vote (Wauters, 
Verlet & Ackaert, 2011). The system of electronic voting has gradually been introduced in 
Flanders. In 1994, only in the municipalities of the Antwerp arrondissement and in one 
municipality in East-Flanders, this system was used (in total 32 municipalities or 10 % of all 
municipalities). For the local elections of 2006, a system of electronic voting was used in 143 
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local municipalities (or 46 % of all municipalities). In such a system a screen with all parties  
and with the possibility to cast a blanc vote is first presented to the voter. More, the ‘blanc 
vote’ button is presented in the same layout as the buttons with the party names. This might 
suggest the citizen that this kind of vote is as an equally valid alternative and stimulate the 
voter to cast out a blanc votes. In  municipalities where paper/pencil voting is still the rule, the 
alternative is not explicit but rather implicit.  On the others hand, the existence of computer 
voting might create a threshold for citizens who are (in line with political resources theories) 
less familiar with ICT-tools and keep them away from the ballot station.. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that electronic voting will increase absenteeism as well as blanc/invalid voting. 
4. Data 
 
Data on these four groups of variables are gathered by using several sources. Data on 
political, electoral and geographical data were found in a database on local governments (X, 
2009). Most of the data on the socio-economic and geographic profile of Flemish 
municipalities were found on the website on local statistics of the Flemish government 
(Studiedienst Vlaamse Regering, 2009). The data on electronic voting come from the Belgian 
Home Department. For the number of associations at the local level in Flanders we as 
mentioned refer to Lauwereysen & Colpaert (2004).  
The social demographic variables are: 
- pct. of citizens younger than 35; 
- pct. of citizens older than 65; 
- pct. of females; 
- pct. of unemployed youth; 
- pct. of citizens with non EU roots. 
The social capital variable is expressed by the number of voluntary organisations on 1000 
citizens. 
The political variables are: 
- number of political groups in council on the eve of the elections; 
- number of candidate lists; 
- existence of single party majority on the eve of the elections; 
- presence of Vlaams Belang candidate list; 
Finally, electoral technology refers to the use of computer voting. 
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The analyses are based on the use of hierarchical regressions for 307 of 308 municipalities6.  
 
5. Results 
 
We shall first discuss the impact of the different variables on electoral absenteeism and 
secondly on the use of blanc/invalid voting. 
 
a. Electoral absenteeism 
 
Table 1 estimates the impact of the different groups of variables on the level of electoral 
absenteeism. 
 
Table III: determinants of electoral absenteeism 
Inhabitants  0,217 ***  0,173 ***  0,069   0,103 * 
Age: pct. - 35 -0,193 **  -0,118 *  -0,036   0,045  
Age: pct. + 65 -0,093   0,113   0,217 ***  0,278 *** 
Pct. females 0,499 ***  0,296 ***  0,230 ***  0,255 *** 
Pct. unemployed youth -0,175 ***  -0,188 ***  -0,206 ***  -0,187 *** 
Pct. non EU origin 0,296 ***  0,311 ***  0,286 ***  0,215 *** 
N. of associations / 1000 
citizens 
- - 
 
-0,342 
*** 
 
-0,285 
*** 
 
-0,251 
*** 
N. of political groups/council - -  - -  0,286 ***  0,257 *** 
N. of candidate lists  - -  - -  0,076   0,039  
Single party majority - -  - -  0,034   0,032  
Presence Vlaams Belang  - -  - -  -0,010   0,002  
Electronic voting - -  - -  - -  0,227 *** 
Adj. R² 48,8%***  56,6%***  63,1%***  67,2%*** 
 
The block of the social demographic variables explain nearly for 50 pct. the level of 
absenteeism. Yet, by adding the three other block of variables, we notice that the direction of 
the relationships does not always remain stable. This is particular the case for the proportion 
of the elderly in the municipalities. Although this variable does not play a role in the first 
block, it has in the final model a significant impact. Further, and as predicted, absenteeism 
increases with the number of inhabitants and citizens with non Belgian roots, what confirms 
our assumptions. However, the test did not confirm our hypothesis concerning the impact of 
                                                 
6 We did not take the smallest municipality into account (Herstappe, 70 registered voters). 
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the social status. Absenteeism seems to decrease slightly with the proportion of young 
unemployed. 
Adding social capital increases the explanatory value  of the model. As predicted, the stronger 
the social the social capital is, the more people seem to visit the ballot stations. 
With regard to the political variables, only the number of political groups on the eve of the 
elections seems to have an impact. As could be expected, a fragmented council seems to 
confuse citizens and by consequence absenteeism. 
Finally, voting technology plays a role. Municipalities where votes are expressed by the use 
of computers count significantly more absenteeists. 
 
b. Blanc/invalid voting 
 
Analogous to the previous table, table IV presents the impact of the different blocks of 
variables on the use of the blanc or invalid vote. 
 
Table IV: determinants of blanc/invalid voting 
Inhabitants  -0,134 *  -0,155 *  -0,063   -0,035  
Age: pct. - 35 0,295 ***  0,331 ***  0,246 **  0,278 *** 
Age: pct. + 65 0,177 *  0,275 **  0,209 *  0,261 ** 
Pct. females -0,048   -0,144   -0,108   -0,088  
Pct. unemployed youth 0,233 ***  0,227 ***  0,329 ***  0,345 *** 
Pct. non EU origin -0,111   -0,104   -0,127   -0,186 ** 
N. of associations / 1000 
citizens - - 
 
-0,163 
* 
 
-0,206 
*** 
 
-0,177 
** 
N. of political groups/council - -  - -  0,174 *  0,150  
N. of candidate lists  - -  - -  -0,118   -0,148  
Single party majority - -  - -  0,054   0,052  
Presence Vlaams Belang  - -  - -  -0,404 ***  -0,394 *** 
Electronic voting - -  - -  - -  0,189 *** 
Adj. R² 6,4%***  7,9%***  21,1%***  23,8%*** 
            
*** p<0,001; ** p<0,010; * p <0,050 
First of all, compared with absenteeism, the models used for blanc/invalid voting reach a 
much lower explanatory value. This is particular striking for the social demographic variables 
who explain only for 6 pct the variance. Yet, the directions of these variables confirm our 
main assumptions. Municipalities with as well younger citizens and older citizens deal with a 
higher level of blanc/invalid voting, which might be expected. The use of this (non) vote 
increases also in municipalities with a larger share of young unemployed people. Yet, in spite 
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of our expectations, the use of blanc/invalid voting decreases in the final model in 
municipalities with a large share of citizens with a non-Belgian background. Here too, the 
volume of social capital has an impact: a higher number of voluntary associations reduces 
blanc/invalid voting. With regard to the political variables: only the presence of an anti system 
plays a role. In those municipalities where Vlaams Belang presented candidate lists reduces 
the proportion  blanc/invalid votes. Finally, electronic voting leads to more blanc votes. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This papers emphasizes the role of contextual variables in understanding turnout at local 
elections. We distinguish two types of abstentionism: absenteeism (visible) and the use of 
blanc/invalid votes (hidden). Analysing the determinants of each type lead us to the 
conclusion that both types of abstentionism are different. These determinants explain 
absenteeism quite well absenteeism but lead to a lower degree of satisfaction in understanding 
blanc/invalid voting. 
With regard to the social demographic variables, only the share of elderly in the population 
influences both types of abstenstionism. The impact of the other variables are not stable in 
explaining absenteeism or blanc/invalid voting. For some of them, the are only able to explain 
one of both types. This is particular the case for the scale of the municipality and the 
proportion of the women in the population. They only affect absenteeism, not blanc/invalid 
voting. Concerning the proportion of younger people in the municipality, the reverse occurs. 
If there is any relationship revealed for the other social demographic variables, its nature 
differs whether it concerns absenteeism or blanc/invalid voting. With regard to the impact of 
the here used SES-variable (youth unemployment), we notice a different impact on 
absenteeism on the one hand and blanc/invalid voting on the other hand. Munipalities with 
larger proportions of unemployed youth have less absenteeists but more blanc/invalid voters. 
The reverse occurs for the impact of the share of citizens with non-EU background. 
Social capital plays a role in explaining both forms of abstenstionism. A larger associational 
life reduces the share of absenteeistst and blanc/invalid voters. 
With regard to the political variabels, we discerned only a clear relationship for the number of 
parties in council and the presence of an anti system party in the electoral competition. The 
figures indicate that the presence of an anti system party candidate list is an alternative for 
blanc/invalid voting. Meanwhile, the number of parties or candidate lists do not influence 
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blanc/invalid voting. If the number of parties confuses citizens, it might hinder them in 
visiting the ballot station but not in casting a valid vote.  
Finally, electronic voting seems not only to keep people at home but also encourages voters to 
express a blanc vote. When ‘blanc’ is offered as a real alternative on the computer screen, 
people use it. By consequence, electoral technology influences electoral participation. 
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Appendix 1: electoral absenteeism – univariate distribution 
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Appendix 2: blanc/invalid voting – univariate distribution 
 
 
